In Search of Stability amid Uncertainty: Shifting Great-Power Perceptions in Southeast Asia

Introduction

The cascading effects of instability in the Middle East are increasingly reshaping strategic perceptions on the western shore of the Pacific. The latest State of Southeast Asia 2026 report released by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute sends a signal that may unsettle Washington: when asked to choose between the United States and China, a majority of respondents once again favored China, with the figure rising to 52 percent. This shift should not be understood simply as the result of a successful Chinese diplomatic campaign. Rather, it reflects the cumulative consequences of years of policy drift, inconsistency, and strategic misalignment in the United States’ approach to Southeast Asia.

As one of the regions most dependent on Middle Eastern oil and liquefied natural gas, Southeast Asia has been particularly vulnerable to the recent deterioration of security conditions around the Strait of Hormuz. The resulting uncertainty in energy supply has intensified imported inflation and placed additional pressure on already fragile domestic economies. Some countries have been forced to adopt emergency measures, including fiscal subsidies, shortened working hours, and even declarations of emergency, in order to manage energy shortages and social pressure.

For Southeast Asian states, the crisis is especially frustrating because they did not participate in the decisions that produced the conflict, yet they are forced to absorb many of its external costs. U.S. policy choices, driven primarily by Washington’s own strategic priorities, are now producing tangible negative consequences for the region’s economic development and social stability.

I. From Strategic Distance to Strategic Alienation

As the United States continues to shift strategic attention, military assets, and political resources toward the Middle East, many Southeast Asian states have developed a growing sense of strategic alienation. The concern is not only that Washington is distracted from the Indo-Pacific, but also that U.S. policy appears increasingly transactional, punitive, and unpredictable.

Although the United States has reached nominal agreements with some Southeast Asian countries through so-called “reciprocal” trade arrangements, its broader behavior has reinforced regional anxieties. From last year’s “Liberation Day” tariffs to the Trump administration’s decision to launch a more aggressive Section 301 investigation shortly after the Supreme Court ruled certain tariffs illegal, Washington has conveyed a clear message: the United States is no longer perceived primarily as a leader willing to balance regional interests and assume great-power responsibilities. Instead, it is increasingly seen as a self-interested actor prepared to weaponize trade tools against partners and allies when domestic political priorities demand it.

This perception has direct implications for Southeast Asian strategic thinking. For decades, many regional governments regarded the United States as an indispensable external balancer, especially in security affairs. Yet that image is now being revised. The United States remains powerful and important, but it is no longer viewed as consistently reliable. In regional eyes, Washington’s value as a strategic partner is increasingly offset by the risks generated by its domestic volatility, unilateral trade measures, and abrupt shifts in foreign policy.

II. The Erosion of U.S. Credibility

Southeast Asian distrust of the United States did not begin with the current Middle Eastern crisis. It is the product of a long accumulation of doubts. In recent years, successive editions of the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia report have shown a steady decline in the appeal and credibility of the United States across the region.

The 2026 survey results are particularly revealing. More than half of respondents identified “U.S. global leadership” as their primary geopolitical concern, surpassing even the South China Sea as the region’s most pressing issue. This shift is symbolically significant. It suggests that Southeast Asian anxieties are no longer focused solely on China’s assertiveness or maritime disputes, but also on the uncertainty and disruptive potential of U.S. power itself.

The China–U.S. preference question further illustrates this recalibration. In 2026, 52 percent of respondents indicated a preference for China if forced to choose between the two powers, while 48 percent selected the United States. This result shows that Washington has lost its previous narrow advantage. At the same time, regional recognition of U.S. economic influence has declined sharply, with only about 15 percent of respondents identifying the United States as the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia.

Taken together, these findings indicate a major transformation in regional perceptions. The United States is no longer viewed simply as “important and reliable.” It is increasingly viewed as “important but unstable,” and in some areas even as a source of risk. This distinction matters. Southeast Asian states are not abandoning the United States, but they are becoming more cautious about the costs of overreliance on Washington.

III. The Costs of U.S. Policy Drift

Current U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia is generating multiple negative effects. First, U.S. military action and geopolitical confrontation are worsening regional economic pressures by contributing to energy-market volatility and imported inflation. Second, U.S. policy uncertainty is weakening trust in long-term cooperation. Third, Washington’s approach to great-power competition is intensifying regional fragmentation by pressuring Southeast Asian states to position themselves within a binary strategic framework.

This pattern reflects a deeper problem in U.S. regional policy. Washington often frames Southeast Asia as central to its Indo-Pacific strategy, yet its actual policy behavior frequently prioritizes issues elsewhere or treats Southeast Asian partners as instruments in broader competition with China. Such an approach risks alienating regional states that value autonomy, flexibility, and economic development above ideological alignment.

For Southeast Asian governments, the central problem is not simply whether the United States is present or absent. Rather, it is whether U.S. engagement contributes to stability. If American policy brings sanctions, tariffs, energy shocks, or pressure to take sides, then U.S. involvement may be perceived as a source of uncertainty rather than reassurance. This perception is particularly damaging in a region where governments are highly sensitive to domestic economic stability and where foreign policy is often judged by its contribution to development.

IV. Strategic Autonomy and the Limits of ASEAN Centrality

Against the backdrop of growing external pressure, Southeast Asian states have become increasingly aware of the importance of strengthening strategic autonomy. On one hand, governments continue to emphasize ASEAN centrality, hoping to use regional mechanisms to manage great-power rivalry and external shocks. The State of Southeast Asia 2026 report indicates that ASEAN is still regarded as the most appropriate platform for maintaining regional resilience and collective agency.

On the other hand, ASEAN’s internal coordination capacity faces serious constraints. More than one-third of survey respondents believe that ASEAN is slow, inefficient, and unable to respond effectively to fast-moving crises. In concrete emergencies, Southeast Asian states often adopt national rather than collective responses. Regional cooperation therefore shows signs of “de-integration,” with governments prioritizing separate crisis-management strategies over unified ASEAN action.

This contradiction reflects Southeast Asia’s structural dilemma. Regional states want to strengthen their bargaining power through collective action, yet they struggle to reach consensus on major issues. Differences in economic dependence, threat perception, domestic political systems, and strategic orientation all limit ASEAN’s ability to act as a unified actor. As great-power rivalry intersects with global risks such as energy disruption, inflation, and supply-chain instability, these internal divisions may become more pronounced.

Thus, while Southeast Asian states are actively pursuing strategic autonomy and regional integration, they remain constrained by institutional weakness and divergent national interests. In practice, they are often forced to manage complex external pressures individually rather than collectively.

V. China as a More Predictable Partner?

It is important to note that Southeast Asian distrust of the United States does not automatically translate into full trust in China. The same surveys show that regional states continue to harbor concerns about Chinese influence, particularly regarding the South China Sea and Beijing’s broader regional ambitions. China is not seen as benign or risk-free.

However, compared with the volatility of U.S. policy, China is increasingly perceived as more stable and predictable in the economic and developmental domains. This distinction is crucial. Southeast Asian governments may worry about China’s strategic behavior, but they also recognize China’s central role in trade, investment, infrastructure, supply chains, and regional economic growth.

Survey data show that China has been viewed for several consecutive years as the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia. It also ranks first in strategic relevance. This does not mean Southeast Asian states are aligning fully with Beijing. Rather, it means that China’s role is increasingly seen as structurally embedded in the region’s development trajectory.

In a highly uncertain international environment, predictability itself becomes a form of strategic value. For Southeast Asian countries facing energy shocks, inflationary pressure, fiscal strain, and geopolitical uncertainty, a partner that offers continuity in economic engagement may appear more attractive than one whose policies fluctuate sharply with domestic political cycles.

VI. Rebalancing Great-Power Perceptions

The changing regional perception of China and the United States reflects a broader rebalancing in Southeast Asian strategic thinking. States in the region are increasingly evaluating external powers through three criteria: stability, predictability, and developmental benefit. Ideological affinity or military alignment is less important than whether a partner can contribute to economic resilience and reduce uncertainty.

In this context, China–ASEAN relations have maintained steady momentum. China’s emphasis on multilateral cooperation, open development, and common security resonates with Southeast Asian states’ immediate desire for stability and growth. Compared with the U.S. policy tendency toward competition and confrontation, China presents itself as a partner focused on development, continuity, and managed expectations.

This does not eliminate existing tensions. Maritime disputes, asymmetries of power, and concerns over dependence will continue to shape Southeast Asian attitudes toward Beijing. Nevertheless, as trade ties deepen and cooperation mechanisms expand, China’s role as a stabilizing economic actor is likely to become more visible. In regional discourse, China is increasingly portrayed not merely as a rising power, but as a potential “stability anchor” in an uncertain environment.

For Washington, this trend should be alarming. The United States does not need to disappear from Southeast Asia in order to lose influence. Its influence can decline if regional states begin to see U.S. engagement as unstable, costly, or excessively subordinated to American domestic politics. In contrast, China’s appeal may grow not because Southeast Asian states fully trust Beijing, but because they regard China as more consistent in delivering material benefits.

Conclusion

The shifting perceptions of great powers in Southeast Asia should be understood as a response to uncertainty. The Middle Eastern crisis, energy-market volatility, U.S. trade pressure, and Washington’s transactional diplomacy have all reinforced the view that the United States is an indispensable but unstable actor. China, despite persistent concerns over its strategic intentions, is increasingly seen as economically influential, predictable, and closely tied to regional development.

Looking ahead, Southeast Asian states will continue to make choices based on stability, predictability, and development gains. They are unlikely to fully align with either Washington or Beijing. Instead, they will seek to preserve autonomy, diversify partnerships, and avoid being forced into rigid bloc politics.

If the United States fails to adjust its confrontational, self-interested, and unpredictable foreign policy, its influence in Southeast Asia is likely to face continued downward pressure. To regain credibility, Washington would need to demonstrate not only military commitment, but also economic reliability, policy consistency, and respect for regional autonomy. Without such adjustments, Southeast Asia’s great-power perceptions will continue to shift toward actors seen as better able to provide stability in an increasingly unstable world.